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1. Introduction 
 
A notable feature of the on-going globalization process of production and services 
via Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been the proliferation of International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as well as 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with investment provisions, in particular. The 
“purpose of investment treaties is closely tied … to the removal of obstacles that may 
stand in the way of allowing and channeling more foreign investment into the host 
states“. (Dolzer and Schreuer 2012, p. 22) 
 
The issue regarding whether the ratification of investment agreements actually leads 
to an increased FDI inflow from the partner economy / economies is the fundamental 
question for policy makers. 
 
This study intends to answer this fundamental question by two routes in order to 
provide the ground for evidence-based policy:  
 
First, we develop an investment literature overview by discussing the main 
theoretical arguments to justify policy intervention in the form of the conclusion of 
IIAs and as to the expected impact on FDI (Part 1: Theoretical Background). 
 
Second, we identify the actual impact of investment agreements on FDI by an 
objective review (meta-analysis) of empirical results put forward to date (Part 2: 
Empirical Evidence).  
 
 
2. Definition of FDI, IIAs and Economic Effects 
 
2.1. Definition of FDI  
 
In brief, FDI reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident 
enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment 
enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. 
(OECD 2008, p. 48) 
 
There are a number of data issues of FDI statistics, two of which are particularly 
relevant when assessing the impact of BITs on FDI:  
 
The empirical literature is divided concerning the use of flow or stock values. Both 
measures have virtues and drawbacks. For example, Bellak and Cantwell (1998) 
discuss the valuation of FDI stocks. Studies on the effects of BITs on FDI have used 
both measures. 
 
The majority of studies on the effects of BITs on FDI uses bilateral FDI flows as the 
dependent variable. The reported bilateral FDI flow may, however, be considered 
problematic, when FDI is conducted via a third country. (e.g., Hong Kong, China is 
the gateway for FDI into/from PRC). In short, this results in imprecise measurement, 
which has to be taken into account when interpreting empirical results. The 
estimated impact of investment agreements on FDI may thus be an artefact. 
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2.2. Definition of IIAs 
 
Sornarajah (2007, pp. 87ff) identifies four types of sources for the international law 
on foreign investment: “treaties”, “custom”, “general principles of law” and “judicial 
decisions”. IIAs are international treaties, which include substantive and procedural 
clauses.  
 
There are three types of IIAs: first, investment protection treaty; second, investment 
liberalization plus protection treaty. Those two are usually called investment treaties. 
The third type is investment chapter under EPA/FTA (Economic Partnership 
Agreement/Free Trade Agreement). The latter usually cover both liberalization and 
protection. These are termed framework agreements on economic cooperation and 
investment chapters in economic partnership agreements (UNCTAD, WIR 2013, p. 
117, FN 12)1.The term IIAs is used to refer to the two types of investment treaties as 
well as investment chapter under EPA/FTA. The bilateral investment treaty (BIT), 
which is the focus of this analysis is just one category of IIAs. 
 
International agreements/treaties may also be classified in terms of the number of 
contracting parties: When the contracting parties are two, agreements/treaties are 
called “bilateral”. Bilateral agreements can be EPA/FTA and bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). “BITs are agreements between two countries for the reciprocal 
encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's territories 
by companies based in either country.” When the concerned parties are three or 
more, they are called “plurilateral”. Among the plurilateral agreements, regional 
agreements (e.g. NAFTA, ASEAN Treaty on the Protection and Promotion of Foreign 
Investment, Mercosur Agreement) and multilateral agreements are possible. With 
regard to investment agreements, no multilateral agreement has been achieved so 
far. 
 
The distinction of the three types of IIAs bears consequences for the analysis of 
effects of investment treaties. Essentially, the effect of an investment treaty 
(liberalization and protection) is not different from the effect of an investment chapter 
under EPA/FTA. However, analytically, they are different, because it is not easy to 
assess the impact of investment chapter under EPA/FTA on investment. Even if 
EPA/FTA contribute to investment, this may not be because of its investment 
chapter; as there is a possibility that trade liberalization under FTA contributes to 
investment. The effects of IIAs on FDI are discussed in the next subsection. This 
report focuses on BITs and thus does not analyze the trade-investment interrelation. 
 
 
  
                                                           
1
 For example “ASEAN is also considering an ASEAN Comprehensive Agreement on Investment as a part of the 
process of moving toward an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015.” (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011, p. 11) This is 
called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). “The RCEP seeks to create a 
liberal, facilitative and competitive investment environment in the region. Negotiations on investment under 
the RCEP will cover the four pillars of promotion, protection, facilitation and liberalization, based on its Guiding 
Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.” (UNCTAD WIR 
2013, p. 103) 
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3. Theoretical Background 
 
It will be argued that two types of market imperfections arise in investment decisions 
of foreign investors (section 3.1.), which are related to the fact that foreign 
investment is sunk and this may create a short-run incentive for governments to 
change their policies towards foreign investors (section 3.2.). Thus, a credibility 
problem may arise which ultimately leads to an inefficiently low level of foreign 
investments (section 3.3.). Are BITs (or investment agreements in general) a remedy 
to this problem? (section 3.4.) 
 
3.1. Market imperfections 
 
There are mainly two factors that lead to market imperfections in investment 
decisions: adverse selection and time inconsistency. Both types deal with the impact 
of the past on future investment decisions. Adverse selection arises on part of the 
investors and time inconsistency arises on part of (host country) governments.  
 
Information asymmetry is based on a micro-economic perspective and refers to the 
fact that information about the true intentions of a government may be private, i.e. 
“when observers lack information about the beliefs and values that are motivating a 
government to pursue (…)” a certain policy (Tomz, 1997, p. 2; see also Kerner, 
2009, p. 74). When observers are domestic investors, this asymmetry may have a 
serious impact on their domestic investment decisions. The information asymmetry 
will be larger, if the government in question is a foreign government where it is more 
costly for the foreign investor to obtain information, especially when dealing with 
countries that lack credible institutions, e.g. some developing countries. Due to the 
information asymmetry investor’s expectations will be based on their experience with 
past policies and this will inter alia determine their future investment decisions. This 
argument holds independently of the motivation of the policy change. For example, a 
host country government may have lowered its taxes in the past to attract FDI or in 
order to maximize the probability of re-election; or a host country government may 
have raised its taxes in the past due to external pressures for budget consolidation. 
 
The time inconsistency argument has originally been developed with regard to 
macro-economic policies (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1977) but can be applied to 
micro-based policies as well In the context of foreign investment the time 
inconsistency problem is of relevance, if the short-term incentives for host country 
governments are more important than the long-term incentives and thus lead to 
changes in its behavior against the foreign investor. “In other words, time 
inconsistency is said to arise if, though nothing has changed (at least ostensibly), 
these choices are not equal (…)." (quoted from Sasse, 2010, p. 18) 
 
Consequently, the existence of these two types of market failures may serve as an 
economic justification for government intervention in the area of foreign investment. 
 
3.2. Incentives for governments to change investment policies 
 
The market imperfections described in section 3.1. are not only important from an 
investor’s point of view, but they create a very serious problem for governments 
designing their investment policies, because FDI is sunk costs: “Once a firm 
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undertakes a foreign direct investment, some bargaining power shifts to the host 
country government, which has an incentive to change the terms of the investment to 
reap a greater share of the benefits.” (Büthe and Milner, 2008, p. 743) This has been 
termed the “obsolescing bargain”. While at first glance, strengthened bargaining 
power sounds positive from a host country government’s view, it bears potentially 
unpleasant implications.  
 
The importance of the incentive to change the investment policy is related to the two 
types of market failure described in section 3.1. First, it depends on the extent to 
which past information asymmetry on part of the actual investors (i.e. the experience 
of investors with past policies of the host country) impacts on current investment 
decisions. Countries with a younger history of FDI (some developing countries, 
transformation countries) will thus have more room to change investment policies 
than countries which have hosted FDI for a long time. 
 
Second, it depends on the conduct of democratic governments who need to pass 
elections from time to time have a tendency to discount the long-term too much in 
favor of the short-term. This may be aggravated in developing countries, as Büthe 
and Milner (2009, p. 743) argue that „resource-strapped developing country 
governments may have an even greater incentive than governments in advanced 
industrialized countries to discount the long term.“ The aim of such policy changes is 
to shift the division of surplus from the foreign investment in favor of the government. 
There are many ways how the host country government may shift the distribution of 
surplus / profit from the investor to the host state: raising tax levels, raising tariff 
levels, changes in regulation, fees, selective law enforcement, imposing new labor 
requirements etc. The most extreme form is expropriation (Guzman 1998, p. 81).  
 
Against this view, one may hold that governments will have enough incentives not to 
exploit their increased bargaining power, once the investment is sunk. The argument 
usually put forward is that governments may resist the temptation to seize assets 
today in order to create or maintain a reputation that will attract future investment 
(Guzman 1998). 
 
Yet, self-control of the government is unlikely to work in many cases and 
governments may adjust their investment policies frequently. Yet, investor memories 
and expectations place restrictions on such policy decisions.  
 
3.3. The credibility problem 
 
Viewed from the foreign investor’s perspective, no conduct of the government can be 
credible, once the incentives described in section 3.2. exist. This is based on a more 
common reason for market failure, as Inman (1987) points out: Markets cannot 
enforce cooperative behavior of utility-maximizing or profit-maximizing agents. This 
leads to Prisoner’s dilemma situations. Given the incentives for governments arising 
from the obsolescing bargain to re-optimize their investment policy, such policies 
may have a credibility problem. It is noteworthy, however, to emphasize that the 
existence of market failure is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient precondition for the 
credibility problem to arise, as there need not be an intent to deceive on the part of 
the host. It should also be noted, that the dynamic-inconsistency problem remains, 
even if the information asymmetry is completely avoided, i.e. all information is public. 
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(Tomz 1997) An investor will not undertake an investment or be able to enter into an 
efficient agreement with the host country.  
 
As a consequence of the lack of credibility, an efficient investment, which would 
otherwise have taken place, may not be carried out at all or be carried out in a non-
optimal way (too small or too large).  
 
3.4. Policy intervention as remedy to the credibility problem? 
 
Among the policy options to remedy the credibility problem in foreign investment 
policies, governments have chosen BITs in the overwhelming majority of cases and 
more recently regional agreements. BITs address the adverse selection problem via 
their signaling function and the time-inconsistency problem via their protection 
function.  
 
How does a BIT remedy the credibility problem and generate a credible expectation? 
Kerner (2009) argues that there are two economic functions of BITs: First, BITs 
create ex-ante costs (signals) and second, BITs create ex-post costs (commitments). 
Tomz (1997, p. 5) emphasizes that the interplay between these two functions is 
important: “In a setting of imperfect information, all commitments are signals but not 
all signals are commitments.”  
 
The signaling function of BITs Signaling in the case of BITs and FDI may be defined 
as “sending a broadly received “signal” that a country is trustworthy”. (Kerner, 2009, 
p. 74) In other words, doubts about the true intentions of the host country 
government – stemming from the information asymmetry -- can be reduced at the 
side of the investors, as they “update” their beliefs when the host country signs / 
ratifies a BIT. Signing / ratifying a BIT creates serious ex-ante costs on the side of 
the government as “the host state deliberately renounces an element of its 
sovereignty” (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012). 
 
As Kerner (2009, p. 79) points out, BITs can “present enough ex ante costs, or, … 
sunk costs, that ratifying a BIT credibly signals that a state is predisposed against 
expropriating from foreign investors. Any investor can observe the signal sent by a 
ratified BIT, regardless of whether they are protected. To the extent that ex ante 
costs effectively convey credibility, any investor should be more willing to invest in a 
state that signs and ratifies BITs.” 
 
The protection function of BITs BITs protect investors against some types of political 
risk through the inclusion of various substantive (e.g. expropriation, unfair treatment) 
and procedural standards (e.g. investor-state dispute settlement provisions). Thus, 
BITs “present significant ex-post costs to signatory states that violate the 
agreement.” (Kerner, 2009, p. 74) In this view, a BIT is a commitment device2, “which 
should make those commitments more costly to break.” (Büthe and Milner, p. 744) 
  
                                                           
2
 How do commitments raise ex-post costs? According to Büthe and Milner (2009, p. 745) formal 
agreements, such as treaties, make them more visible. Yet, by far the most important reason, why 
BITs make commitments more credible is the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism included in 
the majority of BITs.  
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3.5. Conclusion of theory part 
 
Conceptually, BITs may indeed remedy the credibility problem. Yet, two caveats 
need to be made as BITs may not be the optimal policy intervention: 
 
First, it should be noted that BITs favor foreign over domestic investors (or more 
neutral: discriminate between domestic and foreign investors) by treating them 
differently. Rather, welfare maximizing investment policies should avoid an allocation 
bias between domestic and foreign investors. Measures referring to all investors 
alike are a preferable type of investment promotion policy with little side-effects on 
the allocation of resources (e.g. subsidies or tax breaks, provision of infrastructure). 
 
Second, one needs to assess, whether the conceptual argument of investment 
promotion effect has any empirical support. It is this latter problem to which we turn 
now. 
 
 
4. Empirical Part 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In general, empirical results suffer from the fact that the research process is prone to 
biases. (Stanley and Jarell, 1989) Therefore, particular emphasis will be put on 
correcting the results for publication bias. This is necessary, as publication selection 
leads to the main – if not the only – bias of empirical results and thus may seriously 
distort the evidence and following from it, would lead to misleading policy 
conclusions. In this endeavor, the technique of meta-analysis will be used to uncover 
the genuine economic effect of BITs on the basis of existing evidence. 
 
In order to ensure that only the highest quality of empirical results enters into our 
meta-analysis, we use only results, where a semi-elasticity, as the best measure of 
the effect in question, can be derived. This derivation of a comparable measure of 
the effect size is necessary, because the coefficients presented in the underlying 
empirical studies are not comparable due to different specifications of the underlying 
empirical models. Rather, they have to be transformed. 
 
There are several reasons, why it may not be possible to derive a semi-elasticity 
from coefficients: no standard errors or t-values published; necessary information for 
the derivation of the semi-elasticity, such as mean values of variables, normally 
included in descriptive tables, may be missing; unclear description of the 
specification of the empirical model; authors do not bother to reply to our request to 
provide certain kind of information etc. 
 
One may argue that this does not constitute a problem insofar, as in the meta-
analysis the estimation equation may be transformed and use the t-value as its 
dependent variable and thus the number of observations could be increased by 
using also t-values from coefficients, where no semi-elasticity can be derived. Yet, 
our view is that when authors have reasons not to share the necessary information 
or data or do not want us to use their study at all – even if available on the web for 
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years and quoted widely in other papers – this is a sign of low quality and these 
studies are therefore excluded. 
 
4.2. Method 
 
Heterogeneity in empirical results is common in economics and the study of BITs’ 
effects on FDI is no exception. The main aim here is to correct for publication 
selection bias in the results put forward so far.  
 
Many other biases exist, such as language bias, institution bias etc., but publication 
selection bias is considered the most serious one. Meta-analysis provides a method 
which uncovers the size of publication selection bias of results. (e.g. Hedges 1992) 
 
The question here is therefore not only “What is the average result on the effect?”, 
but rather “What is the bias corrected result?” Only the latter provides useful 
information for decision makers, because it may prevent them from spending too 
many resources on certain measures -- or commitments in the case of BITs. 
 
Concerning the effect of BITs on FDI, the only plausible prior of the effect of 
publication bias is an exaggeration of the effect, i.e. more positive results are being 
published due to the reasons given above. As a starting point, publication selection 
implies that the reported effect (of BITs on FDI) is positively correlated with its 
standard error, ceteris paribus. (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p. 60). 
Therefore, the first estimation equation is: 
 
 =  + 
 +         (equ. 1) 
with  is the reported effect of BITs on FDI in study i;  its standard error; and  the error 
term. 
 
Three empirical models, using weighted least squares, will be used to examine 
publication bias: Funnel-asymmetry testing (FAT), precision-effect testing (PET) and 
the precision-effect estimate with standard error (PEESE). 
 
FAT models the publication selection by 
 from equation 1 as a measure of 
asymmetry.  in equation 1 serves as a correction for publication bias, as the 
expected value of  is  as the standard error goes to zero. Dividing equation 
1 by  yields the following estimation equation: 
 
 = 
 +  1 ⁄ +          (equ. 2) 
 
Note, as  is /, its variance should be approximately constant, which avoids the 
heteroscedasticity problem of equation 1. 
 
First, we test : 
 = 0 in order to reveal whether there is publication selection – 
FAT.  
 
Second, we test :  = 0 – PET. Is there a genuine underlying empirical effect 
beyond the potential distortion due to publication selection?  
 
 = 
 +  1  +⁄         (equ. 3) 
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Below, the graphical representations of FAT, i.e. the funnel plots will be shown as 
well.  is the coefficient on precision, 1 ⁄ , which is measured on the y-achsis of 
the funnel plot. 
 
Third, it has been frequently argued, that PEESE provides a better estimate of the 
underlying true effect, when there is an effect. Thus, it is recommended to use the 
PEESE corrected estimate of  from equation 3, “if we have reason to believe that 
there is a non-zero effect (i.e. rejecting :  = 0 using equation 2).  
 
These considerations are summarized in the following schema for investigating and 
correcting publication bias (based on: Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p. 79, Figure 
4.7.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. Dataset 
 
A critical decision is which studies should be included. Our policy regarding the 
inclusion / exclusion of studies is the following: 
 
Inclusion of studies by the following criteria: 
• It is possible to derive a semi-elasticity from the coefficients.3 
• The study is a quantitative study and available in electronic form – not 
necessarily freely. 
• Studies have been published in English language. 
• FDI must be the dependent variable in the empirical specification and BITs 
must appear on the RHS of the equation, yet not necessarily be the variable 
of main interest in an empirical study. 
 
                                                           
3
 For the justification see the remarks on the quality aspect of this criterion in the introduction to the 
empirical part above. 
: 
 = 0 
1: Conduct FAT 
2: Conduct PET 
Accept     Reject 
:  = 0    :  = 0 
4: We fail to find sufficient evidence 
of an empirical effect. 
3: Estimate  using PEESE 
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Exclusion of studies by the following criteria: 
From the start, we have excluded two PhD theses (Tortian 2007, Siegmann 2008), 
as they contain a host of results and it is difficult to choose the appropriate results. 
• In addition, the following studies have been dropped from the dataset, 
because authors did not want us to use their study, despite it is available on 
the internet (Jandhyala et al. 2010, because it is too preliminary; and Tobin 
and Rose-Ackerman 2005, without giving any reason why they did not want 
us to use their study). 
• If an earlier version of a journal paper has been published in working paper / 
discussion paper form, and the journal paper and its earlier version are very 
similar, we drop the earlier version, assuming that the refereeing process has 
led to an improvement of the paper. 
 
Exclusion / loss of observations by the following criteria: 
• missing standard errors;  
• missing mean values of variables, which does not allow to derive a semi-
elasticity; 
• due to the inclusion of interaction effects with the BIT variable, which makes 
the coefficient on the BIT variable meaningless, if the overall effect cannot be 
included; 
• exclusion of outliers: semi-elasticities above 300 and below – 300 per cent  
• exclusion of coefficients on aggregate BITs, if included besides a BIT dummy; 
• exclusion of coefficients on effects in sub-periods; 
• exclusion of studies using aggregate outward FDI but not inward FDI 
• exclusion of coefficients on the BIT variable, if derived from models other than 
fixed effects models, where -- in addition to BIT coefficients -- interaction 
terms with BITs have been used frequently. In this case, the BIT coefficient 
cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way independently of the interaction 
effect. 
• Exclusion of results on signed BITs: Only results on ratified BITs will be used, 
as only ratified BITs have legal effect. This does not exclude the possibility 
that signed BITs may have an impact, too.  
 
The studies used are listed in Annex 1. The first empirical studies dealing with the 
effect of BITs on FDI date from 1998 and the most recent studies date from 2015 
(Lejour and Salfi 2015; Urata 2015), which, however have not been included in the 
meta-analysis.The initial dataset has 1000 observations, but only subsamples of 
effect sizes have been used to create the tables below. 
 
4.4. Description of variables 
 
Dependent variable in the meta-analysis: semi-elasticities 
Semi-elasticities are the most convenient measure of effect size, as they refer to the 
percentage increase in FDI due to a one unit change in BITs. 
 
The general form of regression models used is represented by the following 
simplified equation (neglecting subscripts): 
 
 =  +  +  + , 
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where  is the intercept, BIT is the variable of interest with estimated coefficient ,  
is a matrix of the other independent variables that expectedly have an influence on 
FDI,  is a vector of coefficients that belong to the variables of matrix ,  is the error 
term and FDI represents the dependent variable. In the reduced form of this 
regression model, other independent variables and the error term are disregarded 
here. 
 
As the estimating equation in the underlying papers may be specified in level and log 
form, the coefficients published in various studies have been converted into semi-
elasticities as described in Table 1. 
 
As both variables of main interest, FDI and BITs, can be measured in various ways, 
we classify the elasticities by the following dimensions: 
• Measurement of FDI: bilateral between countries versus aggregate for a 
single country; inward versus outward; stock versus flow. 
• Measurement of BITs: in existence or not (dummy) versus cumulative number 
of BITs. (Sometimes both variables have been used at the same time in 
studies as explanatory variables.) 
 
This leads to the following classification of semi-elasticities: 
• Semi-elasticity 1: BIT as dummy, FDI dyadic, inward, flow 
• Semi-elasticity 2: BIT as cumulative in level, FDI aggregate, inward, flow 
• Semi-elasticity 3: BIT as dummy in level, FDI dyadic, outward, flow 
• Semi-elasticity 4: BIT as cumulative in level, FDI aggregate, outward, flow 
• Semi-elasticity 5: BIT as dummy in level, FDI dyadic, inward, stock 
• Semi-elasticity 6: BIT as cumulative in level, FDI aggregate, inward, stock 
• Semi-elasticity 7: BIT as dummy in level, FDI dyadic, outward, stock 
• Semi-elasticity 8: BIT as cumulative in level, FDI aggregate, outward, stock 
• Semi-elasticity 9: BIT as dummy, FDI aggregate4 
• Semi-elasticity 10: BIT as cumulative, FDI dyadic5 
 
Independent variables 
a. Variables classifying the nominator and denominator of the semi-
elasticity 
 
_!", = 1 if FDI is inward FDI with outward FDI as the base. 
 
#_$, = 1 if BIT variable is measured as dummy variable with BIT variable 
measured as cumulative BITs as the base. 
 
$%&'', = 1 if FDI is aggregate FDI with dyadic FDI as the base. 
 
                                                           
4
 Note: Even it may seem implausible at first sight, this combination is possible, if first only one home 
country, often the US, has been considered. This combination is therefore classified as bilateral FDI, 
not aggregate FDI. Second, if the BIT variable is split into BIT-US and BIT-other countries, while 
aggregate FDI is used as dependent variable. The latter combination has not been used in this report. 
5
 Note: This combination is again possible, if cumulated BITs are used as an additional control 
besides dyadic FDI. The coefficients on these additional controls have not been used in this report. 
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$, = 1 if FDI variable is measured as flow variable with FDI measured as stocks 
as the base. 
 
b. Variables accounting for publication selection (commonly called K-
variables) 
These variables describe factors that might affect the researcher’s decision to 
report a given estimate: 
 
, the standard error of the reported estimated coefficient. 
 
(), the inverse of the standard error of the reported estimated coefficient. 
 
)_!#+_%&)+, the number of observation years (T). T affects the number of 
observations on which the published results rest. 
 
)_!#+, = number of observations (N). N affects the number of observations on 
which the published results rest. 
 
+"$%_+,, = number of calculable semi-elasticities per study. A higher number 
reflects that an author(s) has / have also performed sensitivity analysis and a low 
number reflects careful analysis and possibly the presentation of only the 
preferred specifications etc. 
 
, number of citations of journal papers. This indicator measures the number 
of citations according to google scholar. A normalized variable has been used, 
which is !)- =  (2014 − ("#2_%&))⁄ . 
 
 
c. Variables accounting for heterogeneity (commonly called Z-variables) 
Please note as this study does not intend to explain the heterogeneity of 
empirical effects, these factors, influencing the magnitudes of empirical 
effects, have only been used to classify the descriptive evidence on effect 
sizes. They include the following: 
 
)&$_&'), = 1 if a model includes the existence of a trade agreement between 
signatories of BIT. Trade agreements may also stimulate FDI and therefore it is 
an important control variable besides BITs. 
 
#_$', = 1 if one of the signatories is a developing country, with both 
signatories are developing countries or both signatories are developed countries 
as the base). The traditional pattern of BITs was between developed and 
developing countries, yet recently, BITs have grown strongly also between 
developing countries. It is quite conceivable that the effects of BITs on FDI differ 
by the development-stage of countries included in a sample. 
 
(&2, = 1 if estimate relates to panel data with cross-section or time-series as 
base. 
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Table 1 Summary of the derivation of semi-elasticities from coefficients 
Specification  
Dep — indep var 
Calculation of semi-elasticity 
(+) 
Notes 
FDI as dependent variable 
level — level (+) = 100 ∗ #5/66666  
log — level (+) = 100 ∗ #5 
 
(+) = 100 ∗ (75 − 1) 
 
(+) = 100 ∗ (758.:;
<=75> − 1) 
Semi-elasticity:  Adjustment necessary, as the 
independent variable is a dummy variable: 
• according to Wooldridge (2009) 
 
• according to Kennedy (1981) and 
vanGarderen and Shah (2002); +?(#5) is the 
estimator of @?, variance. 
level — log (+) = 100 ∗ #5/(66666 ∗ 66666)  
log — log (+) = 100 ∗ #5/66666 Elasticity ̂ 
FDI Ratio (share) as dependent variable; Examples: (FDI/GDP)-share or [FDI(of country i) / FDI(of all 
countries)]-ratio 
Ratio (share):  
level — level (+) = 100 ∗ #5 ∗
BCD666666
ECF66666
  
 
Ratio (share):  
log — level (+) =  100 ∗ #5 
and adjustment as above 
Ratio (share):  
level — log (+) =
100 ∗ #5 ∗ GH666666
 666666 ∗ 66666
 
 
Ratio (share):  
log — log (+) = 100 ∗ #5/66666 
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("#2_%(, = 1 if paper is published in a journal, with book chapter, working 
paper or discussion paper as the base. Publication selection will be present in all 
media, yet it is expected that the journal review process contribute in addition to 
the authors to publication selection. 
 
!(I!")&2, = 1 if “Top” according to the citation index in “web of knowledge” 
among the top 20 per cent in the respective field; with other publication type as 
the base. “Top” according to the citation index in “web of knowledge” among the 
top 20 per cent: This yielded the following results: Economics: World 
Development, law: Harvard International Law Journal, political science: 
American Journal of Political Science. This also shows how much this issue 
spans across the disciplines. In addition the Haftel (2010) paper, published in the 
Review of International Political Economy has been classified as a top journal. 
Yet, as the “web of knowledge” is no longer accessible, it is based on the ranking 
by Halkos and Tzeremes (2012).  
 
("#2_%&), the year of publication. It is assumed that semi-elasticities will 
decrease over time, as methodology of studies improves over time (e.g. not 
accounting for endogeneity may result in exaggerated effects); as journal will be 
less inclined to publish papers with implausibly large effects; yet, may increase 
over time, as BITs have become more “visible” to investors and thus may enter 
location decisions more often. 
 
#_"+, = 1 if one of the signatory countries is US. The US uses a different model 
BIT than other countries, which may lead to different quantitative effects on FDI. 
 
_#, = 1 if interaction effect with BIT variable is included. It would be of 
interest to include the total effect, i.e. BIT variable and BIT-interaction variable, 
yet this is not possible, as the significance of the total effect cannot be 
established. This variable is used in combination with the next one, fe, for 
excluding BIT variables, if interaction effects have been used. 
 
fe, = 1 if fixed effects are used with other methods as the base. Variable is used 
for excluding the semi-elasticity (see reasoning above).  
 
')&_-!$2, = 1 if the underlying theoretical model is the gravity model with all 
other models as the base 
 
!ℎ), = 1 if neither fe, re, pooled OLS or OLS estimation was used (e.g.time 
series); with other estimation methods as the base 
 
$!', = 1 if model includes control for endogeneity with no control for 
endogeneity as the base. 1. The effect of endogeneity is ambiguous: As host 
and home states stand to lose more the higher their bilateral FDI, failure to 
account for this endogenous relationship should lead to over-reporting of the 
effect of BITs on FDI and thus larger effect sizes. Yet, in the same vein as the 
above argument on groups of BITs, host states have the greatest incentives to 
pursue BITs when their expected gain in FDI is highest, i.e. when bilateral FDI is 
low. A failure to account for the endogenous relationship would lead to under-
reporting of the effect of BITs on FDI and thus to smaller effect sizes. 
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)_ℎ!+, number of host countries included. This is an indication of the size and 
heterogeneity of the sample used in a particular study. 
 
!2%_$'_ℎ!+, = 1 if host countries are only developing countries with mixed 
(developed and developing) host countries as the base 
 
2!', = 1 if long-term effect with all other estimates as the base: Short-run vs. 
long-run effects have been distinguished only by three studies: 12, Egger_Merlo 
(2007); Peinhardt and Allee (2012) and Buethe and Milner (2014). The 
distinction of short- and long-run is of interest, as BITs create investor 
confidence and thus overcome the credibility problem described above only over 
the long run. Trust cannot be built overnight. 
 
$+, 1 = OECD, 2 = UNCTAD, with other datasets as the base. As there are 
basically only two datasets available, any bias in the results would be of interest. 
 
()!, 1 = study controls for investment provisions in regional trade agreements, 
with no control as the base. There are only three papers – Büthe and Milner 
(2014), Berger et al. (2013) and Lesher and Miroudot (2006), who examine the 
effects of investment provisions enshrined in regional trade agreements (usually 
termed “trade agreement + investment agreement”) in addition to BITs, so the 
evidence is quite scarce. 
 
 
Table 2 Overview on variables used in the analysis 
Moderator 
variable 
Definition 
 Standard error of the reported estimated coefficient 
() 1/standard error of the reported estimated coefficient 
("#2_%( Publication type = 1 if paper is published in a Journal, = 0 if 
book chapter, Working Paper, Discussion paper etc. 
!(I!")&2 Topjournal = 1 if “Top” according to the citation index in “web 
of knowledge” among the top 20 per cent in the respective 
field; with other publication type as the base 
)_!#+_%&)+ Number of observation years 
)_!#+ = Number of observations 
+"$%_+, = Number of usable semi-elasticities per study 
#_"+ = 1 if one of the signatory countries is US 
_# = 1 if interaction effect with BIT variable is included 
)&$_&') = 1 if a model includes trade agreement between signatories 
of BIT 
#_$' = 1 if one of the signatories is a developing country (= 0 if 
both signatories are developing countries or if both 
signatories are developed countries) 
(&2 = 1 if estimate relates to panel data with cross-section or 
time-series as base 
("#2_%&) Year of publication 
16 
 
')&_-!$2 = 1 if the underlying theoretical model is the gravity model 
with all other models as the base 
!ℎ) = 1 if neither fe, re, pooled OLS or OLS estimation was used 
(e.g.time series); with other estimation methods  as the base 
$!' = 1 if model includes control for endogeneity with no control 
for endogeneity as the base 
)_ℎ!+ Number of host countries included 
fe = 1 if fixed effects are used with other methods as the base 
!2%_$'_ℎ!+ = 1 if host countries are only developing countries with mixed 
(developed and developing) countries as the base 
_!" = 1 if FDI is outward FDI with inward FDI as the base 
#_$ = 1 if BIT variable is measured as dummy variable with BIT 
variable measured as cumulative BITs as the base 
$%&'' = 1 if FDI is aggregate FDI with dyadic FDI as the base 
$ = 1 if FDI variable is measured as flow variable with FDI 
measured as stocks as the base 
2!' = 1 if long-term effect with all other estimates as the base 
 Number of citations of journal papers: number of citations 
according to google scholar 
$+ 1 = OECD, 2 = UNCTAD, with other datasets as the base 
()! 1 = study controls for investment provisions in regional trade 
agreements, with no control as the base 
 
4.5. Descriptive Results  
 
This subsection presents a brief overview on the semi-elasticities. The mean value of 
semi-elasticities ranges from 4 per cent to 13 per cent (see Table 3 and Table 4) and 
the median values range between 1.9 per cent and 19 per cent, which is a-priori not 
implausible from an economic point of view. 
 
Due to various factors described above, the results published in scientific journals 
may differ from those published in working papers, books etc. Our data reveal a 
substantially higher semi-elasticity for semi-elasticity 5 and a slightly higher one for 
semi-elasticity 2, while a lower one by the order of 1/3 for semi-elasticity 1, when 
published in a journal. Interestingly, if only the top journals are considered, for semi-
elasticity 1 the picture changes only slightly, but for semi-elasticity 2 the semi-
elasticity published in the top journal is 4 times those published in other media. 
 
Over time, there is no convergence of semi-elasticities discernible, independently of 
their definition. (see Annex 3, Figure 1 and Figure 4). 
 
Based on figures on citations (see variable cite above) we have constructed a ratio 
which shows the average annual citation of studies. The least number of quotations 
was 0.625, the largest number almost 40. This is strong evidence that among the 40 
studies, very few have been very influential. 
 
Dividing studies / estimates into those derived from models taking endogeneity 
between BITs and FDI into account, reveal a strong reduction, with the mean value 
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of semi-elasticity 1 dropping from 24 to 4 per cent and for semi-elasticity 5 from 35 to 
6 per cent. 
 
Since mainly two datasets have been used, one from OECD and the other one from 
UNCTAD, we were interested to see whether semi-elasticities show a bias, but the 
descriptive evidence across semi-elasticities is inconclusive. Likewise, the evidence 
about short- and long-run effects as well as between BITs and investment provisions 
included in trade-agreements does not show systematic differences. 
 
Comparisons across groups of semi-elasticities are interesting, but do not reveal the 
extent of bias included in the results. The following section addresses this question.  
 
4.6. Results on corrected effect size 
 
Given the large number of different semi-elasticities listed in section 4.4., this 
suggests to provide a differentiated picture of the effects of BITs on FDI, rather than 
a catch-all number.6  
 
First, detailed results on the effects of BITs on the corrected effect size of BITs on 
inward FDI are presented. (see 4.6.1.) Second, results on the corrected effect size of 
of BITs on all bilateral FDI, aggregating inward and outward FDI, are presented. (see 
4.6.2.) Descriptive statistics underlying FAT, PET and PEESE are presented in 
Appendix 2, Tables 14-20. 
 
4.6.1. Detailed results on the effects of BITs on inward FDI 
 
When BITs are measured as a dummy variable, which is usually the case when 
bilateral FDI data are used, the effect size measures the marginal impact on FDI of a 
country-pair, which had no BIT, upon the conclusion of a BIT.  
 
Annex 3, Figure 2 shows the size distributions of semi-elasticities, when BITs have 
been measured as dummy variable. 
 
Turning to FDI flows first, Table 3 shows that the estimate accommodated for 
publication selection bias is in the order of 8.2% (standard deviation of 5.2; 11.1). 
Yet, this is likely to overstate the true effect and hence these effects need to be 
qualified: first, they do not pass the PET; second, the uncorrected mean of the 10 
percent most precise estimates is only half (6.7 percent, see Table 13); and third, 
according to the funnel plot shown in Annex 3, Figure 3, the most precise estimates 
are close to zero. This kind of evidence clearly shows that using just single studies or 
relying on an average effect can be very misleading. 
 
These characteristics also apply qualitatively to FDI stocks (see Annex 2, Table 2) 
and thus, we have to accept that the literature has failed to provide evidence with 
respect to an effect of BITs on bilateral inward FDI flows and stocks.  
                                                           
6
 Nevertheless, we have performed the FAT, PET and PEESE also on the overall effect (N=309), controlling in 
addition for inward FDI vs. outward FDI, bilateral FDI vs. aggregate FDI and BIT dummy vs. BIT cumulative. The 
results are: there is a genuine effect on FDI, as it passes the PET. However, PEESE reveals that the effect is 2 
per cent and thus economically not significant. (see Annex 2, Table 4 andTable 10) 
18 
 
Table 3 Impact of BITs on FDI when BITs are measured as dummy 
FDI N Unweighted 
average in 
% 
… corrected 
for publica-
tion bias +) 
Size of 
publication 
bias in % 
Pass the 
PET? 
Economic 
signifi-
cance 
   Inward FDI    
Flow 79 13.8 8.2 41 No Yes 
Stock 11 8.7 3.2 63 No No 
***… 1%; **… 5%; *… 10% significance; +) Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), p. 61, equ. (4.3.) 
 
When BITs are measured in terms of the cumulative stock of BITs, which is usually 
the case when aggregate FDI country data are used, the effect size measures the 
marginal effect on FDI of an average country upon increasing its total stock of BITs 
by an additional BIT. 
 
Annex 3, Figure 4 shows the distribution of the effects over time and Annex 3, Figure 5 
the size distribution. Here, we describe results only on FDI flows in Table 4, as FDI 
stocks yielded too few observations. With a publication-bias corrected semi-elasticity 
of 2.3 percent, despite being statistically significant, the effect is negligible in 
economic terms, as FDI flows are highly volatile. In addition, according to the funnel 
plot (see Annex 3, Figure 6 and Annex 2, Table 13) the most precise estimates are, 
again, close to zero. The mean value of the 10 per cent most significant estimates is 
only 16 per cent of the unweighted mean (9.1% inTable 4). 
 
Table 4 Impact of BITs on FDI when cumulative BITs are used 
FDI N Unweighted 
average in 
% 
… corrected 
for publica-
tion bias 
Size of 
publication 
bias in % 
Pass the 
PET? 
Economic 
signifi-
cance 
   Inward FDI    
Flow  111 9.1 2.3 75 Yes no 
Stock 4 4.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
***… 1%; **… 5%; *… 10% significance. n.a. … not applicable;  
+) Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), p. 61, equ. (4.3.) 
 
From this analysis, we conclude that there might be a small effect of BITs on the 
attraction of FDI flows, yet this effect is due to the more imprecise coefficients and 
hence, this evidence is not very convincing either. 
 
4.6.2. Effects of BITs on bilateral FDI, aggregating inward and outward FDI 
 
Aggregation of inward and outward FDI is meaningful only on the bilateral level, as 
inward FDI flows or stocks between two countries should be mirrored by the outward 
FDI of the country-pair, and vice versa for outward FDI.7 Aggregating bilateral inward 
and outward FDI leads to a substantial increase in the number of observations 
                                                           
7
 It is true that in praxi, inward and outward FDI hardly match exactly on the bilateral level. There are many 
reasons for it, yet the discrepancies are getting smaller over time, which is mainly due to the application of 
international reporting standards (OECD, UNCTAD). 
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(N=140). According to the PET in Annex 2, Table 5, there is again no genuine effect 
of BITs on FDI. 
 
4.7. Summary of empirical part 
 
Taken together, the empirical evidence on the basis of a meta-analysis suggests that 
the FDI promotion effect of BITs (measured in terms of a semi-elasticity) seems to 
be economically negligible. This section lists a few explanations for this findings.  
 
A good deal of BITs has been concluded between countries where the danger of 
dynamic inconsistency of economic policy is low or has decreased over time. As 
these countries gained stability and growth, their policies vis-à-vis foreign investors 
have become more predictable, inter alia through supra-national or international 
commitments (e.g., transition economies joining the EU). In addition, several rights 
enshrined in BITs may be granted by other agreements as well (e.g. the four 
freedoms in the EU for new member states). As a consequence, FDI would have 
been undertaken even in the absence of a BIT. 
 
The availability of substitutes for BITs (like private insurance for some types of 
political risk, e.g. expropriation; Bonnitcha and Aisbett, 2012) increases the likelihood 
of an investment abroad even in the absence of a BIT. Moreover, FDI data do not 
distinguish between FDI covered by BITs and those not covered. 
 
A related issue is “treaty shopping”, which is a common practice of multinational 
firms: Studies using aggregate FDI data and aggregate number of BITs (see semi-
elasticities 4r and 6r) face the problem that FDI data do not reveal, whether the 
actual FDI has been made from a different country than the country whose BIT is 
invoked in case of conflict, and hence the measured correlation may be spurious. 
 
As many FDI were made before BITs were concluded between certain country pairs, 
an important causality issue is present and regression results, however small they 
are, may therefore overstate the actual effect. 
 
A serious shortcoming of existing studies, namely the fact that most studies have 
used only the quantity of BITs, but not the quality of BITs, has to be mentioned in this 
context. Recently, a few studies have been published (Berger et al. 2013) which 
revealed to what extent treaty content matters. In particular, they have shown that 
the effect of BITs on FDI depends on whether a certain provision has been included 
into the treaty or not. Liberal admission rules generally promote FDI, but dispute 
settlement provisions play a minor role. (Berger et al., 2013, p. 268) This poor 
measurement of BITs in empirical studies is a strong determinant of their findings.  
 
On the basis of applied methodologies, results of empirical studies must be 
interpreted mostly as short-run effects. Yet, trust is not built overnight but long-run 
effects are difficult to derive. 
 
With regard to the FDI promotion effect of BITs, our reading of the results of 
empirical studies is that BITs do not function “stand-alone”. Rather, BITs indirectly 
exert an effect on FDI in the context of other determinants of FDI, institutional 
determinants in particular. (See Leibrecht and Bellak, 2015 for a discussion of BITs 
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as FDI incentives.) Thus, we do not share the view as expressed e.g. by Busse et al. 
(2010) who conclude that “BITs may even substitute for domestic institutions.” 
 
From a conceptual point of view, BITs are part of a system of almost 3,000 
agreements and in turn are part of a system of international investment law. Once a 
systemic view is taken (see Poulsen 2011, Poulsen et al. 2013), a lack of coherence 
in BIT standards as well as in the application of BITs (by arbitration tribunals) is 
revealed. For example, based on a large number of interviews, Poulsen (2011) 
reports a severe lack of knowledge on the side of host country authorities about the 
actual application of treaties. For instance, it is often uncertain and can require 
lengthy and costly litigation to determine, if a government’s decision to alter the tax 
policy or incentive regime actually does constitute a breach of the BIT. And different 
tribunals may come up with different answers based on the same set of facts. Such 
evidence shows clearly that BITs may not be able to automatically solve both types 
of market failures and exert a significant positive effect on FDI.  
 
5. Summary 
 
This study set out to discuss the fundamental question of whether IIAs increase 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from a theoretical and empirical perspective. In the 
light of the very heterogeneous empirical evidence put forward so far, the innovation 
compared to earlier studies has been to employ a meta-analysis technique to 
address this question. 
 
In a nutshell, the positive impact of BITs on FDI suggested by theoretical reasoning 
has not been confirmed empirically.  
 
However, our results should not be read as implying that BITs are useless, as 
investor protection may enhance the effects of other types of investment policies and 
location factors, not least incentives, on FDI. Thus, the BITs’ promotion effect may 
work mainly indirectly, i.e. via other location determinants, which impact more 
strongly on FDI, in case a BIT is in place. In other words, BITs may be very helpful 
for the individual investor in case of problems which arise in the host country, yet 
BITs do not deliver as a policy to increase aggregate FDI directly. Thus, investor 
protection is a legitimate policy goal. 
 
Besides, BITs may have a signaling effect, as described in the theoretical part.  
 
While we have to conclude that BITs are not an important means to attract FDI 
through their FDI protection function, BITs may contribute substantially to the 
sustainability of FDI, as they allow taking legal action against the host country 
government in certain cases. This is not only possible during the existence of the 
BIT, but also after the BIT has expired (by termination, by elapse of time etc.) as the 
rights enshrined in BITs are usually guaranteed for a substantial period after 
expiration. 
 
Apart from these economic considerations, political motives may be strong 
explanatory factors behind the dramatic growth of BITs. (see e.g., Jandhyala et al. 
2011) 
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The relevant policy decision rests on the extent governments are prepared to tie their 
hands via IIAs. Commitments enshrined in BITs imply a reduced policy space in 
other policy areas. This may lead to inefficient policy conduct in other areas, e.g. 
domestic regulation, and may take the form of “regulatory chill”, i.e. that otherwise 
welfare enhancing policies are not introduced at all or the need to pay compensation 
(on the basis of an IIA) for the introduction of regulations in the common interest. 
Therefore, the key decision parameter in signing new IIAs should be the net welfare 
effect between welfare gains from FDI (which are by no means automatic) and 
welfare losses from the limitation of the de facto right to regulate in other areas. This 
study suggests that policy makers should be very cautious in signing IIAs. 
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Annex 2: Detailed regression results 
 
1. FAT - PET 
Note: all estimation results shown here were derived using STATA reg procedure, 
weighted least squares, and option cluster; cluster = study; standard errors are 
heteroscedastic-robust; meta-regression model 4.2. in Stanley and Doucouliagos, p. 
61 has been used. 
 
FAT – PET: BIT dummy – inward FDI 
Table 1 BIT dummy: FAT-PET on FDI flows (N=79) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
prcn .0189325  .0191736 0.99 
constant 1.767955 ** .5296169 3.34 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
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Table 2 BIT dummy: FAT-PET on FDI stocks (N=11) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
prcn .0132413  .0143665 0.92  
constant 1.290235  1.020864 1.26 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
FAT – PET: BIT cumulative – inward FDI 
Table 3 BIT cumulative: FAT-PET on FDI flows (N=111) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
prcn .0201563 *** .0031216 6.46 
constant .4166666  .261213 1.60 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
FAT – PET not applicable for FDI stocks 
FAT – PET: Overall effect 
Table 4 FAT-PET for all observations in the sample (N=309) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
prcn .0200201 *** .0031939 6.27 
inout .2381918  .404485 0.59 
fdi -.257537  .4387118 -0.59 
dyagg -.0278076  .2429131 -0.11 
bit_dc 1.069095 * .3638939 2.94 
constant .772421  .643186 1.20 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below  
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FAT – PET: all bilateral FDI used (inward and outward) 
Table 5 BIT dummy: FAT-PET on inward and outward bilateral FDI flows (N=140) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
prcn .0300834  .0242978 1.24 
constant 1.604068 ** .5217404 3.07 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
Table 6 BIT dummy: FAT-PET on inward and outward bilateral FDI stocks (N=48) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
prcn .0070313  .0109525 0.64 
constant 2.090673 *** .4180808 5.00 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
 
2. PEESE 
Note: all estimation results shown here were derived using STATA reg procedure, weighted 
least squares, and options noconst and cluster; cluster = study; meta-regression model 4.3. 
in Stanley and Doucouliagos, p. 61 has been used 
 
PEESE: BIT dummy – inward FDI 
Table 7 BIT dummy: PEESE on FDI flows (N=79) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
SE -.0102144 ** .0031182 -3.28 
prcn .0818565 *** .0106334 7.70 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
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Table 8 BIT dummy: PEESE on FDI stocks (N=11) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
SE -.1604094  1.018052 -0.16 
prcn .0320008 * .0093836 0.076 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
 
PEESE: BIT cumulative – inward FDI 
Table 9 BIT cumulative: PEESE on FDI flows (N=111) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
SE .2495046  .3006219 0.83 
prcn .023074 *** .0027066 8.52 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
For FDI stocks: not applicable 
 
PEESE: Overall effect 
Table 10 PEESE for all observations in the sample (N=309) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
SE -.0713615 *** .0199674 -3.57 
prcn .0202172 *** .0029331 6.89 
inout .2717  .3657526 0.74 
fdi -.1394313  .3986547 -0.35 
dyagg .5960846  .5494158 1.08 
bit_dc 1.748901 *** .3657244 4.78 
 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
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PEESE: All inward and outward bilateral effect 
Table 11 BIT dummy: PEESE on inward and outward bilateral FDI flows (N=140) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
SE -.0104804 * .005738 -1.83 
prcn .0967268 *** .0208959 4.63 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
Table 12 BIT dummy: PEESE on inward and outward bilateral FDI stocks (N=48) 
Dep var: 
tstat 
Coefficient  Std.Err. t-value 
SE 1.576933  2.873734 0.55 
prcn .0602938 ** .0228511 2.64 
Note: ***… significant on 1 percent level; **… significant on 5 percent level; *… significant 
on 10 percent level; 
See also descriptive statistics below 
 
 
3. Most significant semi-elasticities 
Table 13 The ten percent most significant semi-elasticities 
Semi-
elasticity 
number 
Mean of 10 percent 
most significant 
elasticities 
Standard deviation Comparison item: 
Mean across all 
observations 
1 6.67 4.305522 13.76 
5 4.64 3.846631 8.66 
2 1.45 1.247492 9.11 
6 n.a. n.a. 4.00 
n.a. … not applicable, due to low number of observations 
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4. Descriptives 
 
Table 14 Semi-elasticities on inward FDI 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Semi-elasticity 1 79 13.76301 19.14516 -99.98456 53.08345 
Semi-elasticity 5 11 8.664829 31.30487 -77.52351 35.39145 
Semi-elasticity 2 111 9.111212 30.91182 -26.87501 207.7477 
Semi-elasticity 6 4 4.000956 2.129736 .8133263 5.184693 
 
Table 15 Semi-elasticity 1: Variables used in FAT, PET and PEESE 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 79 2.147805 1.373088 -1.6 6.317356 
prcn 79 20.06343 12.78298 .023766 54.49102 
SE 79 .9596599 5.578871 .0183516 42.077 
Note: tstat … t value; prcn … 1 / standard error; SE … standard error 
 
Table 16 Semi-elasticity 5: Variables used in FAT, PET and PEESE 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 11 1.542174 1.470094 -1.360532 4.05 
prcn 11 19.02673 32.41394 .9114574 113.1579 
SE 11 .2653462 .3437095 .0088372 1.097144 
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Table 17 Semi-elasticity 2: Variables used in FAT, PET and PEESE 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 111 1.671237 1.997104 -1.277799 8.674418 
prcn 111 62.2421 70.5258 .6296297 266.9231 
SE 111 .2387375 .3565229 .0037464 1.588235 
 
Table 18    Overall effect 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 309 1.966337 1.652407 -1.6 8.674418 
prcn 309 33.17483 49.17535 .023766 266.9231 
SE 309 .434422 2.84974 .0037464 42.077 
 
Table 19 All inward and outward bilateral: FDI flows 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 140 2.047098 1.497828 -1.6 6.518182 
prcn 140 14.72674 11.77861 .023766 54.49102 
SE 140 .6953949 4.209456 .0183516 42.077 
 
Table 20 All inward and outward bilateral: FDI stocks 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 48 2.228006 1.061107 -1.360532 4.52 
prcn 48 19.53159 19.05611 .9114574 113.1579 
SE 48 .1158152 .1811036 .0088372 1.097144 
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Annex 3: Figures 
 
Figure 1 BIT dummy: Semi-elasticities over time (blue: inward flow; red: inward stock) 
 
 
Figure 2 BIT dummy: Histograms for semi-elasticities  
inward FDI flows (left) and inward FDI stocks (right) 
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Figure 3 BIT dummy: Funnel plots  
 
Figure 4 BIT cumulative: Semi-elasticities over time (blue: inward flow; red: inward stock) 
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Figure 5 BIT cumulative: Histogram of semi-elasticities inward FDI flows 
 
Figure 6 BIT cumulative: Funnel plot 
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